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Abstract—With the ever increasing amount of eHealth data
available from various eHealth systems and sources, Health
Big Data Analytics promises enticing benefits such as enabling
the discovery of new treatment options and improved decision
making. However, concerns over the privacy of information have
hindered the aggregation of this information. To address these
concerns, we propose the use of Information Accountability
protocols to provide patients with the ability to decide how and
when their data can be shared and aggregated for use in big
data research. In this paper, we discuss the issues surrounding
Health Big Data Analytics and propose a consent-based model
to address privacy concerns to aid in achieving the promised
benefits of Big Data in eHealth.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Health Big Data Analytics has the potential to solve many
current and future healthcare problems, from discovering new
treatments to improved decision making. Analysis of such
large eHealth datasets could enable the discovery of new
treatment options [1], improved population health and better
policy making [2]. In the current environment, health data is
distributed in data silos, and we need to bring the data together
to reap the full benefits that big data analytics can provide.
However, numerous concerns over the privacy and security of
the data hinder such approaches.
In the current eHealth environment, there are conflicting
requirements between patients and HCPs, with patients de-
siring greater control over who can access their information
and how it is used, and HCPs wanting easy access to as
much medical information as possible to make well-informed
decisions. This conflict was highlighted in the recent review
of Australia’s national Personally Controlled Electronic Health
Record (PCEHR) system [3]. In the patient controlled model,
HCPs may be discouraged from using such systems because
they are unable to rely on eHealth record (EHR) as a complete
source of information on a patient they are treating [4, 5].
An appropriate balance of these competing concerns must be
achieved so that the full benefits of systems like the PCEHR
can be achieved [6].
In order to balance these competing concerns, we devised
an Information Accountability Framework (IAF) that applies
Information Accountability (IA) protocols to eHealth systems.
By applying accountability and transparency for data use, the
IAF and so-called Accountable-eHealth systems ensure health
information is available to the right person at the right time
without rigid barriers while empowering the consumers with
control over their information.
The initial model of the IAF was designed for use primarily
in shared eHealth Record (SEHR) and local EHR systems,
but did not address how the protocols could be applied to Big
Data analytics. The possibility of supporting approved research
studies while respecting patient privacy preferences through a
consent model and ensuring accountability for the information
users needs to be investigated and the IAF model needs to be
expanded to include these stakeholders.
In this paper, we explore the privacy issues surrounding
Health Big Data analytics, and the possibility of using an
Information Accountability model and framework to provide a
patient consent approach to health data aggregation and study
participation. We begin in Section II with a discussion of
the background of our work. In Section III, the IAF and IA
protocols are explained. In Section IV, we propose a possible
consent model for Big Data analytics using the IA protocols.
Section V describes some of the major challenges involved in
implementing the proposed model. Section VI concludes the
paper with a discussion of future work.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Information Accountability
Information contained in eHealth systems is often very
sensitive in nature, and as such, it is vital that access to that
information is appropriately managed. When implementing an
EHR system, the security of the stored data, access control
and access monitoring must all be considered [7]. Traditional
preventive access control measures that rigidly deny access
to users without appropriate permissions are insufficient on
their own in the domains like eHealth with its complex access
requirements, and as a result a number of researchers have
begun working on augmenting these preventive measures with
accountability [8–10].
Information Accountability involves the use of policies and
mechanisms to enforce appropriate use through after-the-fact
accountability for intentional misuse. Misuse is defined as
the unauthorised access, use, modification, or disclosure of
information, or other use of information that is not for the
purpose for which the information was provided [11, 12]. The
Fig. 1. Information accountability model for health big data analytics
presence of IA mechanisms is intended to act as a deterrent
for such misuse [8].
With information dissemination being one of the primary
causes of concern among consumers, it is important that it is
clear to patients how their information is used, and who it will
be disclosed to both now and in the future [13]. With regards
to Cloud-based hosting of EHR information, Rodrigues et al.
[7] state that appropriate security mechanisms must be put in
place while making it transparent to patients how their data is
managed. Such transparency is one of the fundamental aspects
of Information Accountability [9].
There have been a number of proposed approaches to
implementing IA mechanisms, such as Jagadeesan et. al. [14]
who attempted to develop a formal foundation for the design
of IA systems using privacy policies to define appropriate
use of information, focusing on using audit logs that can
detect potential policy violations and information misuse.
Their approach focused on using audit logs which can detect
potential policy violations and information misuse. Weitzner
et. al. [9] proposed a transparent audit process that would track
all transaction, and make use of policies combined with policy-
aware transaction logs and a policy reasoning capability to
enable systems to hold users of information accountable. These
studies generally focused on IA and accountable systems from
a general point of view without consideration for the specific
requirements of eHealth systems.
B. The need for accountability in Health Big Data Analytics
In this paper we define “Big Data” in health as a collection
of medical data that is so large, so complex, so distributed,
and growing so fast that it becomes difficult or impossible to
maintain and analyse using traditional software and hardware
[15]. In 2012, it was estimated that worldwide digital health-
care data was equal to 500 petabytes and is expected to reach
25,000 petabytes in 2020 [16]. It is believed that analysing
Health Big Data can lead to improvements in the quality of
healthcare and support better clinical decision making [1, 2].
With the large growth in this health information from the
variety of medical systems and sources, there comes significant
issues such as interoperability and the creation of data silos
[17]. To protect patient privacy, big health data is often
scattered and intentionally isolated among institutions [18].
To increase the potential of Health Big Data analytics, we
must find ways to address patient privacy concerns while also
encouraging the various producers of this health information
to share the data. Weber et. al. [18] states that there is a need
for a consent mechanism that can enable patients to “decide
how and when their data can be shared with or “mashed up”
against other databases.” This is the gap we believe the use of
Information Accountability can fill.
III. INFORMATION ACCOUNTABILITY FRAMEWORK
In the Information Accountability Framework devised for
use in eHealth systems, four types of users were initially
modelled into the framework: data owners (i.e patients), data
users (i.e healthcare professionals) using health information for
legitimate purposes, data users who misuse health information,
and a central health authority (HA) (i.e. a government agency).
Data owners have explicit control over which of their preferred
HCPs can access their information and are able to set usage
policies to grant or limit access further. The HA is in place
to ensure that HCPs always have access to the information
they need to provide appropriate care through default policies,
without unnecessarily hindering the patient’s privacy [19].
The IA mechanisms implemented in the IAF enable users
who misuse data information to be to be held accountable and
deters those with ill intent through a fear of being caught, with
clear messaging of the consequences of actions conveyed to
users. Incentives are given to the users to follow the procedures
and enforce appropriate use.
A key component of accountable systems are policy-aware
transaction logs [9] which provide provenance of the data in
the system. Using such logs, the provenance of the data can be
compared to usage policies to determine if an action complied
with those policies [20]. In the IAF, all information access and
other events in the system are logged along with policy used to
determine whether the action should be permitted. As a result,
the information they contain can also be considered sensitive
and must be protected [21]. These logs are made available
to the data owner in a user-friendly format which they can
review at any time. The IAF actively monitors all actions taken
in the system for potential breaches of policy and provides
notifications as needed. For example, when a HCP makes an
invalid access request, the system notifies the patient of the
potential misuse of their eHealth information with a log that
can be reviewed and referred to when submitting an inquiry
asking the HCP to justify their actions [22].
When the system detects possible misuse of a patient’s
health data, the patient is able to submit an inquiry asking for
a justification of the actions taken by the relevant HCP. The
HCP must then provide an explanation to justify their need to
access the relevant information. Once this is done, the system
uses a semantic reasoner and rules defined by a HA along with
the context of the information access, usage policies, and the
HCP’s justification to determine whether misuse occurred and
further investigation is required.
This model has been validated and surveys conducted into
user acceptance, but it hasn’t been fully implemented and it
must be expanded to provide for more diverse users and use
cases, including its applicability for use in managing privacy
in a Big Data Analytics use case.
IV. APPLYING THE IAF TO A HBDA PROCESS
In order to reap the benefits of shared eHealth information
systems for Big Data Analytics and encourage the sharing of
information through providing transparency and accountability
to information usage, we have devised a model the sharing
of eHealth information that makes use of the principals of
the initial Information Accountability Framework. The initial
model focused on patient control, but for the purposes of
information sharing and enabling big data analytics and re-
search on eHealth information, we must also consider the view
point of the producers and providers of eHealth information
as stakeholders in the collection and use of this data.
In our IAF model, patients would be able to explicitly
consent as to whether or not their data could be aggregated
with other patient data in order to conduct analytics. Through
accountability mechanisms, they would always be informed
how and why their information as being queried and used,
and the results shared for the purposes of improved healthcare.
In the devised information accountability model for sharing
eHealth data, healthcare professionals and other producers of
eHealth information are also able to specify policies over
how the information they produce is aggregated and used.
These policies are then combined with patient policies and
policies set by a governing Health Authority to determine
which information is aggregated for a patient from that data
source. The process for this model is demonstrated in Figure 1.
We define four different types of users to demonstrate this
model:
• Data Owners: Data owners refers to the individuals to
whom the data refers to, i.e. patients.
• Data Providers: Data providers refers to the groups and
individuals who produce and/or store the information
that will be aggregated. Data providers could be various
types of healthcare providers such as hospitals, general
practitioners, an X-ray clinic, etc.
• System Manager: A system manager refers to the or-
ganisation responsible for maintaining the shared eHealth
information system, and setting appropriate policies and
investigate potential misuse. This could be a government
department.
• Data Users: Data users refers to those who would make
use of the aggregated data, such as healthcare profession-
als, approved researchers, and government studies.
A. Setting policies
1) Data providers: Data providers (i.e. hospitals, special-
ists, etc.) are able to opt-in to sharing their data and set usage
and aggregation policies on the information they produce.
For example, a general practice may be willing to share
condition and medication summaries about patients, but not
detailed notes made by the patients’ doctor. A policy de-
picting this example is represented in Open Digital Rights
Language (ODRL)—an open standard rights language capable
of expressing a wide range of policy-based information—in
Listing 1.
2) Data owners: Data owners (i.e. patients) are able to opt-
in to participate in studies through usage policies on their
information. Patients maintain control over who has access
to their information and in which contexts. When the data is
aggregated for the purpose of a study, a filtering stage applying
patient usage policies to the information is conducted.
3) System manager: System managers who oversee the
shared eHealth data system, such as a government’s health
department, set default policies and restrictions on data col-
lection and use.
B. Data aggregation
In the model, a data aggregator collects information from
the data providers. While doing so, it queries the IA service to
retrieve an aggregation policy set made up of data owner and
data provider preferences in order to ensure it only aggregates
permissible data and avoids patients who have not opted-in to
their data being collected.
C. Querying and accessing data
When a data user executes a query in the system, the query
service retrieves a policy for the data user. This can include
rules regarding which data they can access, how they can use
data, and required de-identification of the results.
If they are permitted to perform the query, the retrieved
rules are then applied to filter the result set, removing restricted
information. The information access request is logged, and the
policy versions used to determine the access request is stored
with the context-aware log entry.
D. Access to logs
The logs produced in an accountable system can contain
sensitive information themselves and must be appropriately
protected, including restricting who can view these logs and
for what purpose [21].
1) Data providers: Data providers can view log summaries
of when and what information was aggregated. The logs
maintained by the accountability can also be used for risk
management, as if information originating from a data provider
is found to have been misused or leaked, they can verify who
accessed their information aggregated in the system.
2) Data owners: Data owners can view the log entries for
their information. They can review these logs at any time, and
submit inquiries for events identified as potential misuse.
3) Data users: Data users will be able to access specific
log entries regarding their own access to patient information.
They will be able to review the entries when they receive an
inquiry requesting that they justify why they needed to access
the relevant information in the given situation.
4) System manager: The system manager will be able to
view all logs and provenance information for the aggregated
data for the purposes for investigating potential misuse de-
tected by the system. They will also need to be able to verify
the integrity of the log entries and usage policies.
V. IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES
Many challenges remain to be investigated in order imple-
ment the proposed IAF model when accounting for Big Data
Analytics use cases. We believe this provides fertile for future
research into this proposed Big Data accountability model to
verify its practicability.
A. Scalability and performance
At the scale of Big Data, When performing data analysis at
the scale of big data, the complexity of the queries can result
in superexponential growth in computing time as the data set
increases [15]. With that in mind, it is still important that
additional access and privacy controls applied when querying
data can scale. In producing a prototype of this model, the
efficiency of applying these controls to filter and present results
must be considered, as well as techniques for minimising their
effects.
<o:policy xmlns:o="http://odrlextension.
org/ns/odrlx/2x" xmlns:eh="urn:ehealth
.gov" type="http://odrlextension.org/
ns/odrlx/2x/privacy" uid="policy-use-
ehr">
<o:permission>
<o:asset uid="urn:ehealthSystemData
:11986" relation="o:target"/>
<o:asset uid="urn:ehealthSystemData
:11986" relation="x:collection"/>
<o:party uid="urn:healthProfessional
:10946" role="o:assigner"/>
<o:party uid="urn:ehealthSystem:1458"
role="o:assignee"/>
<o:action name="o:aggregate"/>
<o:constraint name="o:dataType"
operator="o:isAnyOf"
rightOperand="eh:prescription
eh:conditionSummary"/>
</o:permission>
</o:policy>
Listing 1. Example aggregation policy for a general practice represented in
ODRL
B. Log storage and presentation
For accountability to work, appropriate provenance informa-
tion must be stored and verifiable [21]. In a Big Data query,
the results must generate policy-aware provenance information
that can be used to verify how, why, and when a piece of
information was accessed. This creates a challenge of how
to efficiently store such data while maintaining privacy and
security of the information they contain, as the logs themselves
can contain sensitive information [21]. Likewise, a principal
of accountability is the transparency of the information use
to data owners, so the presentation of this information to
patients so they know who accessed their information and
under what conditions, provides additional scalability and
usability challenges.
When HCPs access health information on individual pa-
tients, this can easily be handled; however, when a researcher
accesses parts of the data of millions of patients from many
data providers, this creates a challenge of how best to store
and present the provenance information.
C. Data heterogeneity
Due to the diverse systems that produce health data which
come in various formats, the heterogeneity of the data is a
major challenge for Big Data Analytics [15]. For the account-
ability mechanisms to work, the framework must be able to
match up data types to in the information to those used to
define policies, presenting a challenge of how to normalise
the aggregated data.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Health Big Data Analytics has the potential to solve many
current and future healthcare problems, from discovering new
treatments to improved decision making. However, concerns
over patient privacy have hindered the aggregating data from
the various sources of eHealth information for such use cases.
In this paper, we have proposed an information accountability
approach to addressing the privacy concerns of combining data
for health data through a patient consent based approach. In the
IAF model applied to the Big Data use case, patients are able
to opt-in to health trials and decide how and when their data
can be shared with or combined with other databases as part
of a study, while maintaining accountability and transparency.
Additionally, the model aims to manage risk and encourage the
sharing of data by healthcare providers by ensuring they have
control over how the information they produce is aggregated
and used.
Future work will involve prototype implementations of an
Information Accountability service for use in this model, veri-
fication of the models using health data, further investigations
into the challenges of implementing this approach at scale and
user testing to verify the usefulness and acceptability of the
model.
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